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Abstract
As we have addressed in an earlier article, quantitative evaluation of R&D policies often approaches the outcomes of 
initiatives without effectively considering differential impacts on economic agents. Our goal is to confirm the existence 
of “segments” of firms according to their outcomes arising from participation in a given R&D program. Data is gathered 
from Eureka Program’s Final Reports (2000-2005 and 2006-2008) from Spanish, Italian, French, British, and German 
firms. Classification focus is directed towards variables related to innovation projects’ outcomes. Log-likelihood clustering 
method was used. Tests for differences between clusters in terms of some variables of interest were performed. Results 
are consistent with the hypothesis of marked heterogeneity in firms’ outcomes. This methodology offers a valuable 
instrument for RTD policymakers in terms of monitoring and ex post intervention.
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Introduction
Innovation policy is about generating desirable behavior in 
firms through the creation of a framework of incentives for 
the supply-side of the economy. According to a Schumpet-
erian view of economic systems, innovation would generate 
overall growth through the establishment of new and im-
proved industries and business practices. We then part from 
the assumption that innovation is a central feature of the 
process of economic growth and development (Metcalfe, 
1995). Therefore, related policies are a matter of great con-
cern worldwide where the science-technology-innovation 
system is continuously and rapidly evolving and integrates a 
context in which business competition is increasingly based 
on its terms (Freeman and Soete, 2009).
In the European Union this situation is not different, even 
though some idiosyncrasies of it make this bloc an inter-
esting case for studies. The process of integration leads to 
incentives for agents to further invest in innovation, since 
access to a larger market becomes readily available. Europe 
needs to be more innovative in order to achieve a higher 
level of competitiveness – which requires a change in the 
valuation of innovative activities and a better framework 
for innovation to develop (European Commission, 2006). A 
direct implication of this perspective, especially in times of 
crisis, is that RTD investments need to become more pro-
ductive, considering that there is not enough capacity for 
larger amounts of funding. 
In operational terms, this means that the evaluations of 
such initiatives happen to be extremely important. If more 
efficient application of resources is required, then charac-
teristics of R&D expenditures must be understood deeply 
(Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2002). Nonetheless, the process 
of RTD policies’ evaluation is somewhat multidimensional 
and it presents blurry connections in terms of causality and 
its inherent direction (bi-directional relationships are often 
found in literature), thus making it difficult to evaluate the 
actual impact of these activities (see, for example, García, 
2010). We can attribute this point of view to the fact that 
innovation involves complex interactions between agents 
and the environment they are embedded in (Smith, 2000). 
This gives an idea of the complexity involved not only in 
formulating innovation policies, but also in evaluating their 
impact, and that is why a proper management of innovation 
is a challenge for many countries, including developed ones 
(Aghion and Tirole, 1994).  
The foundation of such assessment lies on the authors’ un-
easiness with the relative lack of literature focusing on dif-
ferential impacts of innovation policies on companies. While 
there is are extensive studies of policies’ effectiveness based 
on quasi-experimental methods as well as on impacts on 
companies’ innovative and/or economic performance, we 
find a gap in terms how these policies affect different compa-
nies in heterogeneous ways. If we regard evaluation of RTD 
policies as a linear phenomenon which would impact firms 
homogeneously, implausible assumptions would have to be 
accepted, where overall results could easily be distorted by 
influent observations, driving evaluation results positively or 
negatively while not being representative of actual develop-
ments (Fischer, 2012). 
Companies have long acknowledged that addressing diverse 
audiences with a uniform supply would result in a large pro-
portion of unsatisfied customers. Strategies of market nich-
es and segmentation were developed, where subpopulations 
could be approached in an (almost) optimal manner. Simi-
larly, firms represent the “market” for innovation policy, but 
how can standardized initiatives generate adequate benefits 
for agents that are distinct in so many dimensions (size, R&D 
intensity, short and long term objectives, etc.)? Consequent-
ly, how can the evaluation of RTD policies perform fittingly 
if it is undertaken as if firms interact with such programs in 
a similar manner?
Our expectation is to build upon these findings a useful meth-
odology to classify firms participating in international R&D 
cooperation projects and to extract information regarding 
patterns of technological and innovative behavior according 
to companies’ outcomes resulting from their participation in 
a given project. This rationale extends our approach applied 
to case of Spanish companies (Fischer and Molero, 2012), 
considering a broader range of countries (German, French, 
British and Italian firms were added to Spanish ones) and 
further statistical tests were undertaken in order to analyze 
differences between resulting groups. Such analysis should 
provide policymakers with relevant managerial information 
regarding processes of international R&D collaboration be-
tween agents, as well as a suitable tool for innovation pro-
grams’ monitoring. 
The paper is structured as follows: chapter 2 depicts as-
pects related the economics of RTD policies, as well as brief 
notes on their evaluations. Chapter 3 develops on the meth-
odological approach, stating main features of the case un-
der scrutiny (Eureka Program), the data and the clustering 
process, as well as statistical tests. Chapter 4 reports the 
outcomes and compares them with our previous findings. 
Chapter 5 offers some final remarks and policy implications 
of our assessment.   
Economic Rationale Behind Rtd Policies 
Technological innovation policies represent a strategic area 
in the field of public policy regardless of governments’ politi-
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Despite its differences, innovation policy, either neoclassi-
cal or systemic/evolutionary, involves industrial, environ-
mental, labor and social aspects, aiming at the generation of 
economic competitiveness (Kuhlman and Edler, 2003). But 
evolutionary theory influenced technological policies to be-
come more oriented to adaptation of firms and markets in 
an environment of change (Nelson and Winter, 2002). They 
provide the framework for understanding the own sys-
tem’s changes over time. We can affirm then that existing 
institutional structures, including bodies of relevant law, and 
particular government policies and programs, can never be 
regarded as optimal and for this reason they are, and should 
be, always subject to evaluations and constructive criticism 
(Nelson, 2007).
During the last decades, globalization and the shift towards 
knowledge as the source of competitiveness rendered 
the traditional policy instruments less effective (Gilbert, 
Audretsch and McDougall, 2004), creating an environment 
that demands continuous adaptation in public policies and 
initiatives (Bin and Salles-Filho, 2012). Technology policies 
are part of a complex economic landscape and must en-
sure that firms are able to realize their innovative potential, 
meaning that the appropriate R&D policymaking requires 
knowledge about context conditions, group behavior, instru-
ments (and their mix) and policy effects (Ebersberger, Edler 
and Lo, 2006). 
Referring to this latter argument, given the complexity of 
business environments and different sectoral characteristics, 
innovation policies cannot afford to be fully standardized, 
since there is no optimal design for them: these vary across 
countries, technological domains and stages of innovative 
processes (Raymond and St. Pierre, 2010; Klette and Moen, 
1999). Provided there is a high level of complexity and dy-
namism in the policymaking process regarding innovative ac-
tivities, as well as the need for adaptation at the innovation 
system level, evaluation activities become a key element in 
designing better programs to develop innovative capabilities 
and desired changes in behavior and structure. 
Evaluation of Rtd Policies
Since R&D policies can be considered fundamental for long-
term development and are subject to an ever-changing en-
vironment, there is a strong need to continuously evaluate 
their effectiveness (Bayona-Sáez and García-Marco, 2010). 
Furthermore, emphasis should be given to policy trials and 
their evaluation: the process of adaptation may consist in 
trials and errors (Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1997). There is 
a continuous need for better understanding of innovation 
processes and policies aiming at its promotion (European 
Commission, 2002), especially because innovation is disrup-
tive by nature, and it breaks established patterns of behavior, 
cal inclination or geographical relevance (national, regional, 
local or even supranational) (Aghion and Tirole, 1994).  This 
is a result of the role that innovation and technological 
change play in fostering economic growth and its character-
istics of public goods that are likely to create market failures 
(Branstetter and Sakakibara, 2002; Suurna and Kattel, 2010). 
However, RTD policies need to evolve, along with a changing 
socioeconomic environment, as well as regarding issues that 
leave room for improvement. Thus, they are often evaluated, 
adapted and modified in order to provide society with bet-
ter outcomes, and agents with a better framework of action. 
Adaptive policymaking is about facilitation (enabling inno-
vation), understanding the existence of unpredictability and 
indeterminacy in the results of policy initiatives (Metcalfe 
and Georghiou, 1997). Furthermore, innovation processes 
happen in conditions of uncertainty and (in the capitalist sys-
tem) of competition and so must be approached in a holistic 
manner, considering not only technical capabilities but also 
the market environment and the social context (Pavitt, 2003; 
Kline and Rosenberg, 1986).
Innovation is a costly process which can create market fail-
ures related to the nature of technological change, such as 
appropriability issues, amount of R&D investment, spillovers 
and externalities (Klette and Moen, 1999; Smith, 2000; Euro-
pean Commission, 2006a; NIST, 2006). Arrow (1962) argues 
that innovation’s inherent characteristics demand govern-
mental action in order for society to produce an optimal 
level of economic valuable knowledge. This rationale of 
“market failure” still is predominant in justifying the need 
for public policies that approach the problems related to the 
innovative process, fostering an innovation-driven environ-
ment (Bayona-Sáez and García-Marco, 2010; Nelson, 1959; 
Sanz Menéndez, 1995). The main argument is that in a con-
text of perfect competition, there are not enough incentives 
for firms to innovate, given the lack of economic institutions 
that guarantee the return on investments. As examples of 
policies based on the “market failure” mindset we can high-
light Intellectual Property Rights and R&D subsidies.
Nonetheless, it is known that the mere understanding of 
market failures does not provide enough information for 
technological policymaking (Aghion, David and Foray, 2009). 
Even though neoclassical approaches have been widely rec-
ognized as useful for the RTD policymaking process, the 
evolutionary theory in economics has also contributed in 
this arena with a systemic orientation, mainly through the 
framework contained in the National Innovation Systems 
framework of analysis. The Innovation System approach con-
siders the economic and social environment for innovation 
as one where agents do not innovate in isolation, but rather 
through complex interactions. 
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represent a complicated task given the myriad of technologi-
cal initiatives that take place in these nations (ranging from 
basic research direct support to more indirect measures 
aimed at improving the capacity of firms to innovate and use 
new technologies) (Durieux and Fayl, 1997). Like science in 
general, technological policy evaluation might also be consid-
ered as a research and scientific matter (Georghiou, 1999).
Based on this context, our criticism to widespread tech-
niques of RTD policy evaluation lies on the use of methods 
that analyze a large sample of firms as if they behave or 
interacted homogeneously with a given initiative on the one 
hand, and those methods that base their analysis on case 
studies, providing results that are hardly able to provide in-
sights that are applicable to other firms. These are extremes 
that do not comply with practical possibilities of RTD policy 
evaluation, as well as do not take advantage of information 
available. In the next section we outline a simple method to 
combine the utility of large samples and the idea of “cus-
tomization” of evaluations, trying to gather the benefits of 
both kinds of assessments. 
Methodological Approach
Data for this research comes exclusively from Eureka indi-
vidual projects’ dataset of final reports, which was provided 
by the Eureka Secretariat. Such reports are structured as 
questionnaires, containing several questions on different as-
pects. The Eureka Programme was created aiming at enhanc-
ing collaboration between companies in a market oriented, 
non-bureaucratic, bottom-up approach promoting coopera-
tive projects for national funding (Georghiou, 2001; Marín 
and Siotis, 2008). Eureka is present in 38 countries and does 
not act through financial support, but providing projects 
with a seal of approval that facilitates access to govern-
mental funds in the national level (Georghiou and Roessner, 
2000). Its focus is on improving European competitiveness 
and productivity through an enhanced cooperation between 
companies from different Member Countries (international 
collaboration) and research centers in high-tech areas. 
The timeframe used is based on two different periods: 2000-
2005 and 2006-2008 (dates of projects’ conclusion). These 
datasets are analyzed separately because of operational is-
sues. The instrument of data collection suffered changes in 
between these periods, altering aspects such as the exist-
ence of certain variables of interest, as well different sorts of 
measurement scales. In geographical terms, we assessed data 
for five European countries: Spain, Italy, UK, France and Ger-
many. These can be regarded as highly representative of the 
European situation, gathering data for the largest economies 
and which face different stages of development in terms of 
their innovation systems. It is important to notice that such 
observations referred to finished projects, while our analy-
ses used firm-level data. This is justified by the fact that by 
giving rise to unpredictable consequences” (Metcalfe, 1995).
This assertion brings to light the fact that investment in new 
knowledge is not an exact science and will not necessarily 
provide firms with the anticipated returns in terms of com-
petitiveness, which also indicates that these investments may 
not turn into commercialization of outcomes (Audretsch 
and Keilbach, 2008). Nonetheless, it is fundamental for mar-
ket-oriented innovation policies to take into account not 
only technical aspects, but also potential and actual market 
impacts of projects (NIST, 2006). 
In order to cope with such scenario, technological policy 
evaluation provides a systematic and valuable way of adap-
tive learning based on the analysis of practical situations, thus 
representing a resource of great potential for policymakers 
(Georghiou, 2002; Malik and Cunningham, 2006; NIST, 2003). 
The process of analyzing and evaluating RTD policies rep-
resents means to improve the policymaking process, both 
in terms of policies’ suitability to a specific context and to 
achieve managerial progresses in existing programs. The 
structure of relationships within a system, knowledge flows, 
existing capabilities and market conditions also shape the 
scenario for an innovative environment to develop. This pos-
es the relevance of innovation policy in fostering a mosaic 
of desirable characteristics and that might take some time 
to be implemented in a society, which can only be accom-
plished through methodical and frequent evaluation (Euro-
pean Commission, 2006a). 
Evaluation provides measures for success, thus contributing 
to evolution and improvements of existing initiatives (NIST, 
2003), which is dealt mainly with assessments on programs’ 
efficiency and efficacy, i.e., how well the initiative worked, if 
achieved its goals or not, and its contribution to the over-
all policymaking scenario (European Commission, 2006a; 
Georghiou and Keenan, 2006). Hence, evaluation activities 
consist basically in systematically and objectively determin-
ing the relevance, efficiency and effect of an activity consid-
ering its goals, providing policymakers with feedbacks on the 
impacts of such initiatives and creating fundamental knowl-
edge for the promotion of necessary adjustments for future 
policies’ formulation and implementation (Durieux and Fayl, 
1997; European Commission, 2002). Besides making it pos-
sible for program managers to assess the benefits of a given 
initiative, and to identify opportunities for improvement, 
RTD policy evaluation allows the communication of pro-
gram’s results to society (US Department of Energy, 2007).
Currently, the growing complexity involved in technologi-
cal generation increase uncertainties on impacts from RTD 
policies (European Commission, 2002). Moreover, there has 
been an enlarging trend in terms of policy instruments, thus 
implying a need of a more diverse and complete group of 
analytical tools. Accordingly, evaluation activities and the 
identification of policy “best practices” in OECD countries 
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(i) Risky Innovators - companies comprehended in this clus-
ter had the best technical outcomes out of the three clus-
ters, but only partially they can obtain satisfactory market 
results.  
(ii) Inventors - These companies were classified as inventors 
for showing fair technical results without taking advantage 
of it in the market – which does not allow us to define them 
as innovators per se.
(iii) Consistent Innovators - These companies had poorer 
technical results than risky innovators, but they consistently 
achieve positive commercial results. 
This procedure aimed at generating clusters of firms from 
all countries included (Spain, Germany, France, UK, and Italy), 
checking for robustness over time through the comparison 
of cluster structure between 2000-2005 and 2006-2008 
datasets. The goal here is to provide a consistent perspective 
of behavioral patterns of agents, according to their projects’ 
outcomes. 
Furthermore, we tested for differences between clusters 
in terms of some variables of interest, namely (for defini-
tions see table 2): TOT¬_COST, DURATION (via paramet-
ric tests, i.e., ANOVA), RATIO_RD, FUNCTIONING, and 
COUNTRY (via non-parametric tests, using Mann-Whitney 
U statistics, provided that these variables are ordinal). This 
assessment allows a deeper comprehension of clusters, as 
well as a complementary approach to relationships between 
using data of projects we would inflate the influence of vari-
ables related to companies, since several companies were 
involved in more than one project. Thus, we merged data for 
such companies. The resulting structures of datasets were 
the following:
a) 2000-2005 -   77 Spanish firms; 60 German firms; 34 
French firms; 27 Italian firms; 17 British firms. N = 215. 
b) 2006-2008 – 36 Spanish firms; 52 German firms; 19 
French firms; 6 Italian firms; 2 British firms. N = 115.
Based on the outcome aspects of projects – TECHACHIEV, 
COMMACHIEV and EXP_IMPACT (table 1) - we proceeded 
to a categorization of the firms being analyzed for both pe-
riods under study (2000-2005 and 2006-2008). For this ap-
proach, the TwoStep Cluster (SPSS) method was used. This 
method is an exploratory tool designed to reveal natural 
clusters in the dataset according to the parameters indicat-
ed, offering the possibility of suggesting latent taxonomies. 
Also, we used Log-likelihood distances to build the clusters, 
since this procedure allows the use of categorical variables, 
which is not possible with Euclidean estimations.
To establish the optimal number of clusters we devel-
oped on the structure proposed by Fischer and Molero 
(2012). Thus, we shall test for the consistency of 3 clus-
ters. These authors proposed the following categorization 
of firms in an exploratory assessment of Spanish firms in 
Eureka 2000-2005:
Table 1. Outcome variables’ structure for cluster analysis
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Cluster Analyses
This section contains two estimations of clusters. The 
first one represents clusters for 2000-2005 firms accord-
ing to their outcomes (technological, commercial, and ex-
pected). These results are confronted with those found by 
Fischer and Molero (2012)* in an exploratory assessment 
of Eureka’s projects in Spanish firms. Their proposed tax-
onomy is applied to clustering structures, and similarities, 
as well as differences, are discussed. In order to further 
exploit the usefulness of achieved clusters we test for dif-
ferences between groups according to variables which 
correspond to Microeconomic (RATIO_RD), Contextual 
(FUNCTIONING, TOT_COST, DURATION), and Macro-
economic (COUNTRY) dimensions. For this, ANOVA es-
timations and non-parametric (Mann-Whitney) statistics 
are applied. A second stage contains a similar assessment 
for 2006-2008 data.
 
variables that can indicate some form of association which 
can be regarded as an influential cause of success in interna-
tional R&D cooperation projects. 
*  Methodological note I: Countries’ codes are assigned ac-
cording to their relative position in terms of the stage of 
development of their National Innovation Systems. The high-
er the rank, the more developed. Furthermore, they were 
grouped in three categories, where Spain is referred to as a 
laggard Innovation System; Italy, UK and France are classified 
as intermediate Innovation Systems (including, thus, lower 
intermediate, Italy, intermediate, UK, and upper intermedi-
ate, France); and Germany is regarded as the leading nation 
in terms of IS capacities. 
** Methodological note II: Categories 3 and 4 (Weak and 
Bad Functioning, respectively) were merged in order to 
have analyzable data, since observations in category 4 were 
scarce. 
The use of clustering algorithms can be regarded as an in-
teresting tool for policy monitoring and post hoc evaluation, 
since it offers a dynamic view of the interaction between 
influential variables in the determination of agents’ relative 
position in the process, considering that such clusters pre-
sent a stable structure. 
Table 2. Control variables for cross-cluster comparison
*Fischer and Molero (2011) use a dataset consisting of Spanish companies 
only. However, criteria for groups are refined in this present work, since fo-
cus is given on firms’ outcomes. Evaluation between groups characteristics 
regarding other aspects of microeconomic, contextual, and macroeconomic 
dimensions are tested statistically through parametric (ANOVA) and non-
parametric (Mann-Whitney) approaches. This procedure makes possible a 
stronger internal consistency within clusters, while statistical tests provide 
more robust perceptions on their differences regarding other variables of 
interest.
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regard. Lastly, expected impacts for cluster 1 are also posi-
tive, but not outstanding, where Medium and Small impacts 
are predominant. Cluster 1, thus, can be pointed as analo-
gous to the Consistent Innovators group, where firms have 
good technological results (but poorer to those attained by 
cluster 3, as we shall discuss below) and consistent market 
outcomes (achieved and expected). Such firms represent 
the bulk of this particular dataset, where innovation is likely 
to take place, and competitiveness of companies shall be 
maintained (or even increased). Nonetheless, it is not likely 
that such outcomes will have the broad impact that can be 
expected from groundbreaking innovations. We find support 
to this result in Georghiou’s (2001) criticism on the declin-
ing impacts of Eureka projects in general, where risks are 
not being fully taken by agents.
Cluster 2 is similar to cluster 1 in terms of technological 
results, where they are largely rated as Good. Nonetheless, 
perceptions on market impacts point in a different direc-
2000-2005 Segmentation
This first part of cluster analyses considers results for com-
panies with Eureka projects ending within the period 2000-
2005. Results regarding clusters’ structures are provided 
in table 3. Distribution of cases is mainly concentrated in 
cluster 1, while clusters 2 and 3 are of similar sizes. Variables 
used in this analysis turned out to be statistically significant 
separators of the three obtained groups. In a first moment, 
we verify clusters’ features in order to observe the main 
trends in terms of outcomes (technological, commercial, and 
expected) and then we confront these findings with the tax-
onomy proposed by Fischer and Molero (2012). 
Cluster 1 has a strong orientation towards fair (but not ex-
ceptional) achievements. This cluster is characterized tech-
nologically by firms achieving Good results. Furthermore, 
commercial achievements are positive, even though there is 
a relevant presence of firms with Weak attainments in this 
Table 3. 2000-2005 Clusters
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lent commercial results are reported, but also Nil commer-
cial results. Nonetheless, future results are expected to be 
better than those perceived by respondents of the other 
groups. The correspondence of this cluster with Fischer and 
Molero’s (2012) taxonomy finds no perfect match, but the 
presence of an unexpected variability in commercial achieve-
ments expresses the existence of riskier projects, where 
achievements are more relevant, but also are not necessarily 
associated with positive market outcomes. This leads us to 
classify this cluster as Risky Innovators. 
If we confront these three clusters regarding some relevant 
variables for the evaluation of the hypotheses formulated 
in this research, further insights can be found in addition 
to those provided by logistic regressions. A summary of 
such approaches is reported in table 4. Categorical variables 
were tested through Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests 
for independent samples, where continuous variables were 
assessed through ANOVA (Bonferroni and Tamhane’s post 
hoc tests were assigned according to results of Levene’s ho-
mogeneity of variance tests). Also, descriptive statistics are 
provided for each variable within each cluster. 
The variable RATIO_RD, a measure of firms’ innovative 
intensity and a proxy of absorptive capacity, does not re-
sult in an efficient indicator of differences between clusters. 
This can be gathered from an evaluation of means, medi-
ans, and standard deviations. The Mann-Whitney test for 
non-parametric differences between samples confirms this 
perception, where cluster comparisons are not significant 
in any pairwise contrast. This finding is especially relevant 
for understanding the non-linear behavior of technologi-
tion, where Nil Commercial achievements are predominant. 
If this could indicate that such firms may have a longer time-
to-market period, the analysis of EXP_IMPACT shows that 
in reality these agents also do not expect further results to 
unfold over time. The relative position of cluster 2 is the 
worst out of the three clusters in terms of market appro-
priation of results (and expectations regarding future out-
comes). There is a strong correspondence between this par-
ticular group of firms and the Inventors classification, where 
the technological part of projects is fair, but market results 
are disappointing, indicating that little economic impact 
arose from participation in an international R&D coopera-
tion project. Nonetheless, such activity might have played a 
role in enhancing firms’ absorptive capacities and technolog-
ical capabilities, thus contributing to its overall performance 
in structural terms.      
Cluster 3 shows a strong participation of firms with Excel-
lent technological results, thus rating this particular cluster 
in a better position than the other two. In commercial terms, 
this cluster also contains companies with the best results, 
even though stronger variability exists in this regard that 
is not observed in the other clusters. For cluster 3, Excel-
Table 4. 2000-2005 Clusters’ ANOVA and Mann-Whitney tests
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cluster 1, since opinions about achievements can be biased 
by the size of investment made, while firms from cluster 3 
could be more sensitive to results in face of smaller R&D 
expenditures. This brings us to a discussion on the produc-
tivity of projects, and self-reports do not allow for a robust 
conclusion in this case. Nonetheless, such aspect is relevant 
for comprehending weaknesses of such method when gath-
ering data. In the case of DURATION, no difference be-
tween groups could be statistically identified, even though 
means and standard deviations give some support to the 
possibilities outlined above, where cluster 3 is associated 
with projects of shorter duration, while cluster 1 presents 
those projects with longer periods of development (cluster 
2 stands in the middle). In the next section we will explore 
results for the 2006-2008, offering a robustness check for 
the validity of segments’ structure.
Segmentation for 2006-2008 
The analysis of clusters for the period 2006-2008 results 
in clusters of similar sizes in comparison to those found 
for projects finished within 2000-2005. Nonetheless, their 
internal structure differs significantly in terms of achieved 
results. We cannot exclude the chance of interference from 
different scales in the measurement of COMMACHIEV and 
EXP_IMPACT (see table 1 for description of variables). 
The variable TECHACHIEV does not perform well in the 
process of cluster construction, as it can be seen by its lack 
of statistical significance (chi-square) for the three groups. 
The largest group in this case is cluster 3, which has worse 
outcomes in all of the levels under scrutiny. While its profile 
in technical terms is not properly bad, commercial achieve-
ments and expected impacts are fragile (and both are sta-
tistically significant regarding features of this cluster). This 
lack of marketability in face of relatively satisfactory tech-
nological leads us to classify this cluster under the Inventors 
category. 
Cluster 2 is significantly defined only by its rate of com-
mercial achievements. While TECHACHIEV suggests a very 
good profile in the technical dimension (similar to that of 
cluster 1 and above that of cluster 3), market results are 
poor, resulting in outcomes that are basically the same size 
of investments made. Expected impacts, though, are more 
optimistic, outperforming those observed in cluster 3, but 
not as positive as those in cluster 1. Such features, mainly the 
excellent capacity of achieving technological benefits, while 
“failing” in capturing economic benefits from them in the 
present should lead us to classify this cluster also as Inven-
tors. Nonetheless, future expectations indicate the possibil-
ity of satisfactory results in the market. Hence, we define 
this cluster as Risky Innovators, even if its correspondence 
with Fischer and Molero’s (2012) classification is imperfect. 
cal innovation. On the one hand, R&D intensity should lead 
to better technological and market-related results, if one 
would resort to a linear manner of understanding causal-
ity in technological management. On the other hand, this 
indicator shows that segments of firms that differ in terms 
of results do not differ substantially in terms of absorptive 
capacity (considering this variable as a proxy for such). This 
can be regarded as rather surprising, since results refer to 
collaborative projects.  
A similar outcome is achieved for COUNTRY, indicating 
that clustering procedures according to firms’ outcomes 
(TECHACHIEV, COMMACHIEV, and EXP_IMPACT) do not 
produce internally homogeneous groups in terms of this 
variable. We can gather from this result a marginal role of 
nationality in shaping firms’ ultimate achievements. National 
Systems of Innovation, or the macroeconomic scenario as a 
whole, are likely to influence its agents’ capabilities and char-
acteristics, but again, not similarly. Segments in this case are 
weak indicators of firm nationality, regardless of attainments. 
 However, while the variable FUNCTIONING has a com-
parable structure between clusters 1 (Consistent Innova-
tors) and 2 (Inventors), cluster 3 (Risky Innovators) is com-
posed by better rates of project functioning (lower ratings 
represent better results; refer to table 2 for variables’ de-
scriptions). We find statistical support for this indication in 
non-parametric tests, where cluster 3 is relevantly different 
from clusters 1 and 2. This finding provides support for the 
hypothesis that better results (technological and economic) 
are significantly related to projects that excel in managing 
networks properly. Even though cluster 3 has a stronger 
variance in terms of market achievements than cluster 1, 
firms from the former also achieve more relevant economic 
outcomes, thus excelling in innovative attainments. As the 
initiative under scrutiny makes reference to collaborative 
projects that happen in an international context, one can as-
sume that the framework in which innovations develop has 
its complexity increased by the addition of inter-firm trans-
action costs. It is somewhat logical, then, to expect a higher 
relevance for a variable that represents managerial quality. 
In the case of the continuous variables, TOT_COST and 
DURATION, differences between groups show that costlier 
projects are associated with cluster 1 (Consistent Innova-
tors), which shows satisfactory, but not outstanding, results 
for firms. This particular variable complements, as pointed 
out before, the innovative intensity of projects (whereas RA-
TIO_RD represents innovative intensity of firms). The con-
clusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that projects 
with a safer return involve larger amounts of investment, 
even if such investment shall not provide excellent effects. 
Under a different perspective, firms might be more critical 
when evaluating the results of these projects. Under this 
perspective, cluster 3 would not necessarily outperform 
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tion (DURATION). We can then conclude that comparisons 
between datasets (2000-2005 and 2006-2008) do not per-
form well as a robustness evaluation. Besides differences in 
methods of data collection (Final Reports’ structure), such 
finding indicates that results must be regarded carefully, as 
statistical findings are not consistent over time. While this is 
an indication of the weakness of the taxonomy under exami-
nation (Fischer and Molero, 2012), it captures the existence 
of relatively consistent behavioral patterns in firms, suggest-
ing the validity of the methodological proposal contained in 
this research, even though its application in other contexts is 
uncertain before empirical assessments take place.
Concluding Remarks
Concerning the use of clustering techniques for the evalu-
ation of firms’ results according to relatively homogenous 
groups, this procedure is based on an analogous approach 
to that used for market segmentation. The underlying ra-
Cluster 1 in 2006-2008 projects is the one which shows 
consistently better performances in the three dimensions 
used for cluster distribution (significantly represented by 
COMMACHIEV and EXP_IMPACT). We classify this cluster 
as Consistent Innovators. However, this classification does 
not represent perfectly the taxonomy proposed by Fischer 
and Molero (2012), since these companies outperform 
those from the other clusters in all of the aspects involved. 
An alternative would be to name such cluster as Success-
ful Projects, where cluster 2 would be in an intermediate 
relative position, and cluster 3 would not represent failed 
projects necessarily, but those with the worst performance 
out of the three groups. 
The analysis of differences between groups regarding a set 
of variables is presented below (table 6). As it can be no-
ticed, none of such variables return significant results in 
terms of innovative intensity (RATIO_RD and TOT_COST), 
macroeconomic aspects (COUNTRY), and projects’ dura-
Table 5. 2006-2008 Clusters
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Table 36. 2006-2008 Clusters’ ANOVA and Mann-Whitney tests
tionale is that policy intervention is more likely to succeed if 
it fits adequately groups with similar characteristics, instead 
of approaching heterogeneous groups of firms in a similar 
manner. In this research, this fragmentation of Eureka par-
ticipants follows a post hoc structure, where the occurrence 
of relatively stable (and similar) groups of firms according to 
technological and market-related results seems to be more 
efficient than the use of firm-level information or macroeco-
nomic conditions for formulation and adaptation of interna-
tional R&D cooperation initiatives. 
This particular methodology can function as a valuable in-
strument for policymakers in terms of international R&D 
networks monitoring and ex post intervention. The basic 
structure tested in this case is that of Fischer and Mole-
ro (2012) which divides companies in three different cat-
egories. Robustness of this framework was relevant for the 
2000-2005 dataset, while it represented a fragile foundation 
for 2006-2008 projects. Nonetheless, present results repre-
sent a step forward in terms of clustering assessment of Eu-
reka projects in comparison to that undertaken previously 
(Fischer and Molero, 2012), where a larger set of countries 
could be analyzed, more precise estimations could be of-
fered and additional statistical tests were performed.   
Each group presents strengths and weaknesses that can be 
supported through technical and managerial support. Risky 
Innovators lack steadiness in their ability to market results. 
Consistent Innovators represent companies with projects 
that could be addressed in terms of their incapacity to 
exceed fair results (and achieve excellence). Inventors are 
those companies that could not meet their market goals, 
even in face of positive technological outcomes. As a con-
trol instrument, the cluster analyses facilitate evaluations, as 
well as further capacity to deal with such constraints in a 
combined manner (instead of a case-to-case approach). This 
tool also serves the purpose of identifying complementary 
agents that could be matched for future projects (according 
to their particular strengths).
Furthermore, this approach allowed a closer examination 
of influential variables in the determination of outcomes 
arising from Eureka’s individual projects. We could verify dif-
ferences between relatively homogeneous groups of firms 
regarding their inherent differences in a set of aspects. Qual-
ity of projects’ management (FUNCTIONING) was signifi-
cantly associated with higher rates of combined outcomes. 
This particular finding arises as an interesting collateral 
achievement of this research, highlighting the importance 
of managerial aspects related to transaction costs involved 
in (international) R&D cooperation. This particular finding 
represents an interesting tool for RTD policies that aim at 
fostering R&D collaboration, since it provides rather robust 
information that the managerial capacity of networks (which 
can be properly assessed ex ante via an assessment of the 
coordination structure of alliances) is strongly related to ul-
timate outcomes. Consequently, focus on projects that have 
a well-structured partnership will assure policymakers that 
value-for-money in these initiatives will be increased.  
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